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The next-generation technological era will be marked 
by the prevalence of highly automated decision-making 
systems (ADMS), which promote technological 
autonomy at the expense of human agency. In this paper, 
we examine the role and importance of socio-ethical 
factors in the responsible adoption of ADMS by 
organizations. In doing so, we draw on the unique 
characteristics of ADMS and leverage the literature on 
social responsibility to conceptualize what a 
responsible adoption process and a responsible 
adoption decision involve. The resulting framework 
makes a much-needed connection between technology 
adoption and social responsibility and offers a 
progressive foundation to study ADMS adoption.  
1. Introduction  
A number of pundits have started to observe a role 
reversal whereby humans are becoming used and shaped 
by technologies. For example, Demetis and Lee [1] 
claim that “human agency is becoming subordinate to 
automatic executions…” (p. 930) and that “technology 
is overtaking not only human decisions and the context 
of their embeddedness, but also entire subsystems of 
society” (p. 932). We refer to this development as the 
rise of highly automated decision-making systems 
(ADMS). ADMS have several benefits that make their 
adoption by organizations attractive. They are 
consistent, efficient, scalable, and can manage a much 
greater level of complexity than humans can. Yet, they 
are fallible and can yield (intentionally or not) harmful 
consequences such as privacy violations, unwarranted 
surveillance, uninformed control, or unfair 
discrimination [2], [3]. They can also have second-hand 
effects, often detrimental, on those subject to their use 
by others. In sum, ADMS have become quite 
controversial especially given that the activities and 
contexts to which they are increasingly being applied 
involve socially sensitive situations that have high 
ethical content; for example, social ranking [4], crime 
prediction [5], [6], and bail, parole, and criminal 
sentencing [7].   
Our goal in this paper is to develop a theoretical 
framework that emphasizes the socio-ethical factors 
surrounding the decision made by organizations to 
deploy an ADMS. This endeavour, which echoes 
contemporary callings like critical technological 
citizenship [8] and critical digital capitalism [9], as well 
as early writings on the diffusion of new technology 
e.g., [10], [11]–[13], is intended to move researchers’ 
attention beyond the rather instrumentalist perspective 
espoused by existing information technology (IT) 
adoption theories [14], [15]. This literature focuses on 
the questions of why, when, and how prospective 
organizations and individuals adopt or intend to adopt 
an IT for their own use and benefits, without inquiring 
whether the adoption decision or the process leading to 
the decision is socially responsible [16], [17]. 
In developing the framework, we specify a new set 
of constructs to capture the gist of the phenomenon and 
we introduce the theoretical logic underlying their 
relationships. We follow a deductive approach whereby 
we develop a conceptualization of ADMS that considers 
their unique characteristics and we combine it with 
contextualized insights from social responsibility 
theory. The resulting theoretical framework aims to 
make a three-fold contribution: clarifying our 
understanding of what the responsible adoption of 
ADMS by organizations entails, offering a platform for 
future research on the topic, and opening the door to a 
paradigm change in the study of IT adoption that is 
likely to yield important new insights into how 
organisations engage with the decision to deploy (or to 
restrain from deploying) increasingly autonomous and 
value-laden technologies. In the remainder of this paper, 
we specify the theoretical boundaries of our inquiry, we 
present the theoretical framework, and we discuss the 
research’s contributions and its limitations. 
2. Theoretical Boundaries  
2.1. What is an ADMS? 
We define ADMS as software products or software-
enabled objects that bring a significant level of 
automation into decision making processes. 





Importantly, very high levels of automation pave the 
way to technological autonomy, a situation where  
“humans find themselves outside, i.e., cast out to the 
environment, outside of these decisions, and (…) human 
agency—acting on behalf of another, or providing a 
particular service—is being replaced by technologized 
agency” [1], p. 933. As an example of the link between 
automation and autonomy, think of motor vehicles. The 
US Department of Transportation defines six stages of 
automation ranging from level 0 (no automation, i.e., the 
driver performs all the driving task) to level 5 (full 
automation, i.e., the vehicle is autonomous, driverless), 
with intermediary stages where the driver and the 
automated-driving system share control and 
responsibilities.  
ADMS are different from decision-support systems 
(DSS). A DSS is an interactive system aimed at helping 
people (e.g., managers, consumers) make decisions 
(often characterized as ill-structured problems) [18]. In 
turn, an expert systems is a computer program (often 
based on artificial intelligence techniques) that aims to 
mimic experts at making complex, non-algorithmic 
decisions [19][20]. The goal of an expert systems can 
thus include automation, making it similar to an ADMS; 
yet as we will explain, the scope of automation in an 
ADMS can go much further than that of an expert 
system. Because the notions of decision-making and 
automation are complex and central to our 
conceptualization of ADMS, illustrated in Figure 1, we 




(1) Prediction needs data, and so do judgment and 
actions; 
(2) A decision-making agent (human or machine) takes 
actions relying on both prediction and judgment; 
(3) Actions lead to outcome (consequences) 
(4) Outcomes generate data that can be used as an input 
to other/future decisions;  
A: Prediction is automated, and so could judgment and 
action 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual Representation of an 
ADMS (based on [21]) 
 
 Decision making plays an equally critical role in 
everyday life [21] and in organizations [22]. Figure 1 
highlights a fundamental assumption in our work: 
decision making requires applying judgment to 
predictions and then acting [21], all of which may be 
conducted by either a human and/or a machine. 
Prediction is an important input to decision-making “the 
process of filling in missing information… (taking) 
information you have, often called data, and (using) it 
to generate information you don’t have,” ([21], p. 24). 
Note that some decision-making situations can be 
formalized, thus automated, fairly easily. These do not 
rely on prediction and data, but on a set of pre-
established rules accounting for known contingencies. 
Yet, in many complex real-life situations, it is virtually 
impossible to specify and formalize all the rules that 
would be necessary to faithfully capture a situation (e.g., 
hiring a new CEO, driving a vehicle in an urban area). 
Such situations require prediction, thus data. In sum, 
automated prediction is at the core of ADMS 
Note that a predictive engine designed into an 
ADMS may also derive its own rules from data itself 
(i.e., by “learning”)¾this is the domain of machine 
learning (ML), a technology at the core of AI 
applications. AI is an umbrella term that is commonly 
used to refer to data-driven algorithms that enable 
computing engines to learn how to perform tasks which 
would be virtually impossible to automate based on 
formal rules (e.g., object identification, language 
processing). Similar to Demetis and Lee ([1], p. 944), 
we consider such applications as representative 
examples of extreme cases of sophisticated ADMS, 
where predictive models can recalibrate themselves 
automatically based on data. These applications require 
different data sets: a training data set is used to create 
the predictive model, an input data set enables running 
it, and a feedback data set serves as a basis to improve 
the model. 
In the healthcare context an ADMS could automate 
prediction (e.g., estimate the most likely outcomes of 
applying treatments A or B based on X-rays, blood tests, 
and monitoring data) so as to inform a doctor who could 
then apply his or her judgment (e.g., considering other 
criteria such as patients’ age, lifestyle, and sensitivity to 
potential risks and side effects) and enact the decision 
(e.g., administer treatment A). But as Figure 1 also 
stresses, prediction is not the only component of an 
ADMS that might be automated. As with motor 
vehicles, the trend is toward more extensive automation, 
thus full technological autonomy [1], which happens 
when a machine undertakes an entire task, not just the 
prediction component of it. For example, a fully 
autonomous vehicle automates prediction (e.g., 
anticipating vehicles’ trajectory), judgment (e.g., 
evaluating whether the vehicle should hit what would 
appear to be a pedestrian or risk killing the driver), and 
action (e.g., braking or changing direction).  
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2.2 From Adoption to Responsible Adoption 
What does adoption refer to in the context of the 
present research? Information Technology (IT) 
adoption (or acceptance) research offers a large variety 
of models explaining how, why, and when individuals 
or collectives decide to adopt a new technology. Some 
studies have focused on users’ adoption decision e.g., 
[23] while others have examined on organizations’ 
decisions e.g., [24]. Altogether, this research suggests 
that adoption is an information-intensive process 
wherein potential adopters consider a set of relevant 
factors (e.g., about the context into which they situate, 
the innovation per se, its consequences) so as to inform 
a decision about the commitment (of resources) to 
deploy a new IT. We follow this overall view of 
adoption, and we proceed by further asking what 
responsible adoption involves from the perspective of 
an organization.  
In its contemporary usage in a business context, the 
concept of social responsibility (SR) is often associated 
with that of corporate social responsibility (CSR), and 
its application to different business functions such as 
marketing [26], [27], finance [28], and logistics [29]. 
The content covered by CSR has varied over the years. 
For example, in Carroll’s [30] view, CSR touches upon 
economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropical aspects, 
while the European Commission [31] only points to 
social and environmental concerns and the triple 
bottom-line proponents consider economic, social, and 
environmental targets [25], [32]. Despite divergences in 
content, all views concur on the fact that CSR aims to 
promote the accountability of profit-seeking business 
entities in a market environment. Hence, SR is closely 
linked to CSR, but it applies more widely outside of a 
corporate context and in both individual and group 
capacities. Because ADMS adoption decisions are not 
restricted to private corporations, SR appears to be a 
more suitable lens to inform a working definition of 
responsible adoption. In its most generic portrayal, SR 
implies caring for societal values and for needs and 
effects that go beyond narrowly defined indicators and 
self-centered points of reference. On that basis, we 
define responsible adoption in terms of both the 
decision-making process and the decision that take into 
consideration the socio-ethical implications of putting 
an ADMS into use. 
A couple of points in this definition need to be 
highlighted. First, similar to Van der Duin [33] in the 
context of responsible innovation, we choose a broad 
perspective that enables examining responsible 
adoption both as a means (the process) and as an end 
(the decision). Second, while the process and the 
decisions are our two focal units of analysis, some 
entity, at the end, makes a decision and is responsible 
for it. In our context, the entity or entities involved in 
the adoption decision can be viewed as those having 
moral agency. That is, any collective making a moral 
decision, where the later refers to a volitional decision 
that has a moral component given its possible harm on 
or benefit to others [34].  
3. Framework Development 
3.1. Responsible Adoption Decision (RAD) 
We start by specifying three constructs to capture 
the extent of responsibility of an ADMS adoption 
decision. Altogether, these constructs imply that a RAD 
(i) takes into account the moral implications of the 
technology on the community concerned by it (civic-
mindedness), (ii) is sensible to its impacts in the long 
haul (foresightedness), and (iii) is accessible and 
understandable by the community (transparency). 
First, social responsibility theory emphasizes the 
idea that decision-makers have moral obligations. 
Indeed, the primary concern of SR involves the 
consideration of a socio-ethical dimension when acting 
and making decisions; in other words, it requires caring 
for others who might be impacted by one’s actions and 
decisions [34]. This is especially relevant in the 
technological context in general [35]–[37] and in the 
ADMS context in particular, as the range of applications 
that ADMS enable cover highly socially-sensitive 
domains. For example, hiring, evaluating, monitoring, 
censoring, arresting, and judging people are all 
susceptible to being governed by ADMS, and this 
triggers complex risks such as the potential for 
systematic, large-scale discrimination [38] and for 
geopolitical instability [39]. Balancing the benefits and 
risks when it comes to making decisions and innovating 
is not a trivial endeavor, and for ADMS it might require 
weighting conflicting moral values such as security and 
privacy, or freedom and control [3] and considering a 
larger set of ethical principles [40], all of which cannot 
be done unobservant to situational value standards¾we 
will discuss this further in section 3.2. Thus, we define 
as first dimension of RAD, civic-mindedness, as the 
degree to which the adoption decision adheres to the 
values and moral expectations of the community that is 
relevant in the considered context. 
Second, the more recent applications of SR to the 
technological innovation context emphasize the need to 
be prepared and care for the future, that is, make 
decisions that are sensitive to time and forward-looking. 
Technological changes are inherently uncertain, and 
their social consequences are powerful but also hard to 
predict beforehand [41], [42]. However, the difficulty to 
examine an uncertain future, with its multiple causal 
chains and dependencies, does not preclude from taking 
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decisions that are mindful of it [33], [43]. On the other 
hand, it may stress “our ability to act responsibly in the 
present on behalf of future generations” [44], p. 1880.  
ADMS adoption decisions that are responsible should 
be particularly sensitive to this need for anticipation 
because they have substantial societal ramifications that 
make adopters morally accountable to others now but 
also in the future [16], [17]. Thus, we define as second 
dimension of RAP, foresightedness, as the degree to 
which the adoption decision is sensible to the long-run 
implications of using the ADMS on the community that 
is relevant in the considered context. 
A third important notion that links social 
responsibility to ADMS adoption is transparency [45]–
[47]. In general terms, transparency can be viewed as a 
“right to know”, which is a principle that individuals 
have the right to know about the decisions (and possible 
ensuing risks) to which they may be subject [48]. In a 
technology context, transparency has two key 
components, accessibility and comprehensibility  [49], 
and has sometimes been translated into regulation. For 
example, the new European General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”) mentions that “the data subject 
shall have the right to [know about] the existence of 
automated decision-making.” Accessibility and 
comprehensibility are particularly salient characteristics 
in the context of ADMS adoption because ADMS tend 
to be concealed and have indirect, second-hand effects. 
Thus, the socio-ethical quandaries that they produce 
may not be easily resolved, but at minimum, they could 
be open to scrutiny. As reminded by Florini ([48], 
p.viii), it is sometimes the case that “sunshine is the 
strongest antiseptic.” Thus, we define as third dimension 
of RAP, transparency, as the degree to which the 
adoption decision is inspectable and understandable by 
the community that is relevant in the considered context. 
 
3.2. Responsible Adoption Process (RAP) 
Because ADMS are quite unique, a responsible 
adoption process will need to account for their 
idiosyncratic characteristics. Given the absence of 
theory on ADMS, we specify RAP by two means. First, 
we draw on explicit premises about the differentiating 
characteristics of ADMS (i.e., they are opaque, value-
laden, and can have side and systemic effects) to 
identify four constructs that capture the responsibility of 
an adoption process in the context of ADMS. Second, 
we specify (for each four constructs) how they would 
manifest with respect to each conceptual building block 
of an ADMS (data, prediction, judgment, and action – 
see Figure 1)  
A starting premise is that the functioning of an 
ADMS can be quite opaque [50][46][45][50]–[52]. 
Burrel [50] explains that software code can generate 
three types of opacity. One (intentional secrecy) results 
from a decision to keep software code proprietary (e.g., 
the google search engine algorithm). Another (technical 
illiteracy) is a consequence of the specialized skills 
required to write (and read) code and of the fact that 
such skills are not widespread among the population. A 
third type (interpretability) is more specific to ADMS as 
it is a consequence of the complexification of 
algorithmic, often data-driven, systems and the resulting 
difficulty of “understanding the algorithms in action, 
operating on data” (p. 5). Despite some progress e.g., 
[53], [54], explaining the decisions generated by highly-
sophisticated ADMS remains difficult, an issue 
sometimes known as the interpretability problem [55]. 
ADMS can be quite complex and more or less 
autonomous based on whether and how prediction, 
judgment, and action are automatized. To be able to 
evaluate the possibilities and risks associated with 
adopting an ADMS, a clear understanding of its 
functioning mechanisms and assumptions is needed. 
Thus, we define a first dimension of RAP, functional 
scrutiny, as the degree to which the adoption process 
includes a thorough analysis of the key components and 
operational logic of a focal ADMS. A more specific 
coverage of functional scrutiny can be derived from the 
key components of an ADMS (see Figure 1) and is 
presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The Scope of Functional Scrutiny 
 
DATA. Analyzing the data that is being used in the 
prediction: its origin, its quality (e.g., accuracy, 
reliability, completeness), and its role (e.g., training, 
feedback, operation) in the ADMS. 
PREDICTION. Analyzing what is being predicted by 
the ADMS, what factors are used to derive the 
prediction as well as their weight in the prediction, and 
how accurate the result of the prediction is expected 
to be. 
JUDGMENT. Analyzing the potential outcomes (what 
may happen as a result of a potential action), the value 
that is assigned to each outcome, their prioritization, 
and whether the ADMS automatizes judgment or 
leaves it to humans’ responsibility. 
ACTION. Analyzing the decision that is at stake, the 
possible actions associated with this decision, and  
whether the ADMS automatizes actions or leaves it to 
humans’ responsibility. 
 
A second premise is that ADMS embed moral 
values [3], [49], [52], [56]–[58]. The idea that 
information technologies are not value-neutral dates 
back several decades e.g., [59] and is at the core of a 
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number of fields of research such as value-sensitive 
design [35], [60]–[62] and engineering and computer 
ethics [37], [63], [64].  As Van den Hoven [17] puts it, 
our social world is “shaped by the algorithms that 
determine how far our messages reach into our 
networks, what is recommended to us on the basis of 
what the system has learned about our search history and 
preferences, what is filtered out and how our reputation 
is built.” (p. 66) Although all technological design 
decisions may be viewed as morally loaded as they 
represent (intentionally or not) the value system of 
designers, the automatization and scalability of data-
driven predictions make that statement much more 
salient in the ADMS context. In essence, ADMS rate 
and rank things, events, and also individuals [65], [66], 
and this can be particularly problematic when 
predictions are based on sensitive categorizations such 
as race or gender [67]. For O’Neil [38], such algorithmic 
intelligence is nothing else than “opinions embedded in 
math” (p. 19). To be able to examine what is at stake 
from a moral standpoint if an ADMS is to be deployed, 
a clear understanding of the nature and magnitude of the 
ethical challenges it involves is needed. Thus, we define 
a second dimension of RAP, ethical reflexivity, as the 
degree to which the adoption process involves the 
careful deciphering of the moral values embedded in or 
promoted by a focal ADMS. The key components of an 
ADMS (see Figure 1) help further circumscribe the 
scope of ethical reflexivity (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. The Scope of Ethical Reflexivity 
 
DATA. Inspecting the ADMS in function of ethical 
considerations associated with the use of data (e.g., 
privacy, anonymity, security.) 
PREDICTION. Inspecting the ADMS in function of 
ethical considerations associated with operating the 
predictive engine (e.g., transparency, fairness, 
justice.) 
JUDGMENT. Inspecting the ADMS in function of 
ethical considerations associated with the making of 
judgments (e.g., autonomy, accountability.) 
ACTION. Inspecting the ADMS in function of ethical 
considerations associated with the conduct of actions 
(e.g., control, accountability.) 
 
A third premise is that ADMS have indirect and 
systemic effects [68]. By this we mean that a 
(sometimes) large range of people may be involved in 
operating the ADMS as well as be subject to its 
consequences. For example, the data used in a 
prediction engine may not belong to a direct user, and 
the outcomes may include effects on non-direct users, a 
phenomenon that Leidner et al. [69] refer to as second-
hand effects and that Doorn and Van de  Poel [37] 
characterize as indirect causation. The planned or 
emergent consequences of ADMS can thus ripple out to 
a wide range of individuals who may not be directly 
using the technology. Therefore, in order to examine the 
set of potential impacts of an ADMS, the individuals 
who are involved, directly or indirectly, in its operation 
need to be included in the evaluation process. In fact, the 
value of an inclusive approach and the need for all 
relevant agents to exert their influence in a technology-
related decision-making process has long been known to 
facilitate the achievement better results for the relevant 
community as a whole [11]. Thus, we define a third 
dimension of RAP, stakeholder inclusiveness, as the 
degree to which the adoption process involves the 
participation of a representative set of stakeholders 
relevant to the particular context of application of a focal 
ADMS. The key components of an ADMS (see Figure 
1) can help specify the scope of stakeholder 
inclusiveness (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. The Scope of Stakeholder Inclusiveness 
 
DATA. Participation of those whose data is used in the 
ADMS and/or those who generate, collect, and own 
the data. 
PREDICTION. Participation of those for whom the 
prediction is made or who are subject to its outcome, 
as well as those who are involved in designing the 
prediction engine 
JUDGMENT. Participation of those who make the 
judgments or who are subject to its outcome, and if 
relevant, those involved in designing the rules 
underlying the automatized judgment. 
ACTION. Participation of those who conduct the 
actions or who are subject to its outcome, and if 
relevant, those involved in designing the rules 
underlying the automatized action. 
 
The fourth construct we propose to capture RAP 
also relates to the systemic nature of ADMS. To be able 
to execute the socially responsible practice of making an 
integrative assessment of the impacts of an ADMS on 
stakeholders with potentially different interests and 
concerns, prioritization and conflict resolution is likely 
needed [3]. This requires a holistic effort in unifying 
insights and points of view in light of the norms and 
moral standards relevant to a specific societal context 
into which the ADMS might be deployed. Technology 
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engineers are often confronted with moral dilemmas in 
their design work as they need to solve conflicting 
(value) requirements [70]. In doing so, they need to 
resolve difficult trade-offs (e.g., safety vs. efficiency, 
security vs. privacy, control vs. freedom). As Newell 
and Marabelli [3, p. 10] illustrate : “when algorithms 
determine that particular categories of people (e.g., 
based on race, income, job) are more likely to commit a 
crime and, as a result, those concerned find difficulty in 
obtaining a loan or changing job … this clearly violates 
basic privacy rights, but is justified based on the idea 
that it will increase security in society.” Thus, we define 
a fourth dimension, integrative evaluation, as the 
degree to which the adoption process involves a 
systemic evaluation of the consequences of deploying a 
focal ADMS in light of the moral standards acceptable 
in the considered context of application. Similar to the 
previous three constructs, the key components of an 
ADMS (see Figure 1) help specify the scope of 
integrative evaluation (Table 4).   
 
Table 4. The Scope of Integrative Evaluation 
 
DATA. Evaluating the possible consequences of 
deploying an ADMS in light of the moral dilemmas 
associated with its use of data. 
PREDICTION. Evaluating the possible consequences 
of deploying an ADMS in light of the moral dilemmas 
associated with the design and operation of its 
predictive engine. 
JUDGMENT. Evaluating the possible consequences 
of deploying an ADMS in light of the moral dilemmas 
associated with the judgment process. 
ACTION. Evaluating the possible consequences of 
deploying an ADMS in light of the moral dilemmas 
associated with the actions resulting from combining 
prediction and judgment. 
 
3.3. Relationships between the Components of 
RAP and RAD 
In this section, we propose a set of causal 
relationships that we suspect to exist between the 
constructs developed to conceptualize RAP (links 1 to 
6) and RAP (links 7 to 8), and those between RAP and 
RAD (links 9 to 11). They are modeled in the research 
framework illustrated in Figure 2. 
RAP (links 1 to 6). Stakeholder inclusiveness, 
functional scrutiny, ethical reflexivity, and integrative 
evaluation define the degree of responsibility of an 
ADMS’ adoption decision-making process. We start 
with the ultimate outcome in a responsible adoption 
process: integrative evaluation. The difficult integrative 
assessments that need to be made during an adoption 
assessment process, such as those involving the 
comparison and prioritization of different alternatives, 
are more effective when they are supported by quality 
informational inputs [71]. Thus. we expect that 
stakeholder inclusiveness, functional scrutiny, and 
ethical reflexivity will improve integrative evaluation, 
In line with this idea, we propose that integrative 
evaluation will benefit from functional scrutiny (link 1) 
because it will enable the consideration of more accurate 
inputs about what a focal ADMS can afford and prevent.  
Integrative evaluation will also benefit from ethical 
reflexivity (link 2) because awareness and knowledge of 
what is at stake from an ethical perspective with respect 
to a focal ADMS will help generate more complete 
inputs to assess its possible impacts and “what is right” 
in a particular context. Stakeholder inclusiveness will 
enable integrative evaluation (link 3) because including 
a representative set of stakeholders in the decision-
making process is likely to yield inputs that are more 
nuanced, wide-ranging, and thus more reliable. Next, we 
expect that functional scrutiny will enable ethical 
reflexivity (link 4) by affording a more accurate 
representation of the ADMS, which will help detect 
ethical concerns. This could happen via different means 
such as the provision of a conceptual map of the key 
components and mechanisms that will facilitate the 
ethical examination. For example, knowing that the 
judgment component in an ADMS is automated and 
knowing its rules and assumptions will help identify 
ethical concerns that could be associated with it, such as 
whether the judgment logic is reliable, fair and 
transparent. Finally, we expect that stakeholder 
inclusiveness will improve (i) functional scrutiny (link 
5)¾because a more complete set of domain and 
technical expertise should contribute to a more thorough 
analysis of an ADMS’ structure and operational logic, 
and (ii) ethical reflexivity (link 6)¾by providing a more 
complete view of the ethical considerations relevant for 
a focal ADMS. 
RAD (links 7 and 8). Our conceptualization of 
RAD indicates that civic-mindedness, foresightedness, 
and transparency define an ADMS adoption decision’ 
degree of responsibility. We expect that both civic-
mindedness and foresightedness will enable 
transparency because the opening and explaining of a 
decision is easier and less risky when the content of a 
decision is more sensitive to socio-ethical matters. Thus, 
a civic-minded decision is likely to facilitate 
transparency by making the decision more socially 
legitimate, thus less risky to communicate (link 7). In a 
similar vein, we expect that foresightedness will 
encourage transparency because foresightedness 
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involves anticipation and caution, two attributes that 
also favor social legitimacy (link 8). 
 
 
Figure 2. Research Framework 
 
Relationships between RAP and RAD (links 8, 9, 
and 10). Responsible decisions are not likely to just 
happen; instead, they are likely to result from a 
proactive responsible process [35]. Thus, we expect 
RAP and RAD to be related. Integrative evaluation is a 
particularly important component of RAP because it 
involves building on the insights generated by both 
technological and ethical assessments. As such, we 
expect that it will be the key driver of RAD. The three 
resulting relationships can be explained as follows.  
First, we expect that integrative evaluation will improve 
civic-mindedness because it will increase decision-
makers’ awareness and understanding of the socio-
ethical implications of adopting a focal ADMS (link 9). 
Second, we expect that integrative evaluation will 
improve foresightedness because a thorough holistic 
contextual assessment is likely to help better anticipate 
longer-run implications of ADMS (link 10). Third, we 
expect that integrative judgement will also improve 
transparency because it will increase decision-makers’ 
confidence, thus their willingness to make the adoption 
decision available for public scrutiny (link 11). 
4. Discussion  
The framework that we have introduced in this 
paper makes some important contributions. First, it 
introduces a new concept, responsible adoption, and it 
clarifies what it involves in the context of automated 
decision-making systems. ADMS constitute an 
increasingly prevalent type of technology, which is 
often deployed to automate socially sensitive processes. 
The adoption of ADMS by public and private 
organizations, thus their increased presence in society, 
implies a growing dependence on automated systems in 
the making of important decisions affecting people in 
their everyday life (e.g., should parole be given to a 
particular individual) and managerial decisions alike 
(e.g., whom to hire or to promote; which product factory 
to invest in or decommission). This calls for a certain 
level of caution on behalf of the adopting entity. Thus, a 
larger implication of our theoretical model is that future 
research will need to change paradigm when examining 
ADMS. The existing paradigm in the IT literature 
espouses a view that is anchored in premises that are not 
well-aligned with the reality of ADMS and ADMS 
adoption. This paradigm is technophile, value-neutral, 
and it focuses on the assessment of benefits and impacts 
in the immediate surrounding of the decision-maker. In 
contrast, we propose a broader, responsible-centric view 
that considers the socio-ethical and systemic aspects that 
are so inherently tied to the deployment of ADMS. 
Because the present study has focused on laying out 
the conceptual basis for the study of the responsible 
adoption of ADMS, it offers substantial opportunities 
for future research. One important direction to augment 
the proposed theoretical framework is to account for 
contextual factors., that is, investigate how the model 
varies across ADMS adoption circumstances [72]. 
Researchers could start with examining factors that 
hinder or facilitate the enabling effect of integrative 
judgement on the components of responsible adoption 
decisions. These are particularly interesting 
contingencies to study because we have reasoned that a 
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guarantee responsible adoption decisions. In other 
words, other factors and mechanisms might influence 
the presence and strength of these links. Contextual 
factors to consider include those capturing differences 
in the socio-ethical implications that are at stake, such 
as the extent of moral intensity [73], as well as those 
about the domain of application of the ADMS (e.g., type 
of industry), the decision-making setting (e.g., 
organizational ethical culture, organization size, 
subjective norms), and the decision-makers (e.g., 
agency, decision style, education, cognitive moral 
development, personal values) [74].  
In a similar vein, future work could consider how 
those factors and others¾such as technology/ADMS 
self-efficacy [75] and stakeholder engagement and 
participation in IT-related decisions [76]¾could make 
stakeholder inclusiveness, functional scrutiny, and 
ethical reflexivity more effective so as to better support 
integrative judgement.  
Another path consists in examining how different 
types of ADMS influence responsible adoption. For 
example, an ADMS in its preliminary stage of 
development might be perceived as unstable or highly 
risky and thus it might be evaluated differently (e.g., 
ethical reflexivity and functional scrutiny might be more 
salient) than an ADMS that has been used and tested for 
some time. Pursuing this line of research would require 
developing a typology of ADMS and group the types 
along key characteristics and features that are relevant 
to RAP and RAD (e.g., degree of complexity/opacity of 
the ADMS, type of dominant values associated with the 
ADMS, scale of the system affected by the ADMS). 
Another avenue consists in identifying important 
triggers, drivers, and outcomes of RAP and RAD. In 
relation to triggers and drivers, it is important to stress 
that ADMS adoption decisions are rarely made in 
vacuums and that a variety of factors may hinder the 
process as well as the decision. This calls for studies 
about how psychological, social and institutional factors 
may influence responsible adoption including pressures 
to engage in such initiatives. Researchers may account 
for such pressures at different levels including 
individual (e.g., employees), groups (e.g., advocating 
groups), country (e.g., governments), and supranational 
(e.g., intergovernmental organizations) [77].  
Finally, while we have assumed responsible 
adoption to be “good”, how good is it really and does 
goodness vary depending on stakeholder perspectives? 
In other words, what are the consequences of 
responsible adoption? These questions call for further 
investigation into the effects of RAP and RAD on 
different stakeholders and the community in which they 
operate. There is some evidence that corporate 
social/environmental investment can have positive 
effects on financial performance [78], but we do not 
know whether similar or different kinds of benefits can 
be achieved in the case of responsible ADMS adoption. 
5. Conclusion  
Highly automated decision-making systems differ 
from most ITs studied in the past, making the traditional 
adoption paradigm less suitable. In this paper, we have 
leveraged the literature on social responsibility to 
propose a new focus on responsible adoption, 
conceptualized in terms of both a process and a decision 
that take into consideration the socio-ethical 
implications of putting an ADMS into use. The 
proposed framework connects technology adoption and 
social responsibility and offers a progressive foundation 
to study ADMS adoption.  
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